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Mr. Paul has appeared to gain traction in Iowa, drawing 19% support in a poll last week of likely attendees at the state's Jan. 3 caucuses—about double his backing in earlier surveys. That essentially tied him for the lead with Mitt Romney, Herman Cain and Newt Gingrich.
The outreach, combined with a substantial TV advertising campaign, has given Mr. Paul a strong presence in the state. In addition, his longtime call for a smaller federal government resonates with many voters.
But some political leaders and activists see Mr. Paul's devotion to his foreign-policy views limiting his potential support....
Mr. Paul illustrated the possibilities and limits of his campaign during a visit to a Warren County Republican breakfast here recently. He sent the room into broad applause when he reminded the audience that he has long called for closing the U.S. Department of Education—a pet cause of politically active home-schoolers. But the reaction was more muted when Mr. Paul switched to troop deployments.
"We spend way too much money overseas, so I'd start by bringing the troops home from around the world," Mr. Paul said. About half the audience clapped. The other showed no visible reaction.
If he achieves nothing more, Paul will have earned a place in American political history for having pointed out the cognitive dissonance at the heart of the supposedly 'conservative' electorate. Trying to reconcile the principles of limited government at home with an activist foreign policy abroad is akin to the notion of squaring a circle. War, after all, is indeed the health of the state. Given this, nominal conservatives should be loathe to resort to war except under the most strenuous of circumstances, and then only with specified objectives that meet the criteria of Just War. Anything else hands a blank check to those who would be our masters.
Even though I trace the death of the Republic to the evisceration of the States at the end of the War for Federal Dominance, it took the debacle of World War I to truly bring the symptoms to the fore. Through a concerted effort, Britain convinced America that the titanic struggle between European empires was somehow an existential threat to representative government. President Wilson thus launched the "War to End All Wars," mobilizing a Committee on Public Information to drum into the citizenry America's newly acquired obligation to somehow mold a more just world -- by force, if necessary. (How did that turn out, Woodrow?)
A century later, the effects of that indoctrination are still with us, reinforced by the demonization of those in the 1930s who dared to question the value of entering the First World War, and resolved not to get drawn into a second.
The result today is a schizophrenic voting block that simultaneously clamors to reduce the role and power of government, while at the same time supporting the open-ended use of the most powerful manifestation of government: military force. So even as the hand-wringing continues about deficit spending, the domestic role of Uncle Sam and unease over loss of liberty and privacy at home, our nation continues to open up new overseas staging areas for future military confrontations.
...and they say Dr. Paul is the crazy old man...
6 comments:
"...dared to question the value of entering the First World War, and resolved not to get drawn into a second."
Does it mean you view the US participation in the WWII a mistake?
It was certainly a mistake to enter World War One. And while Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor made our entry into WWII both inevitable and at least justifiable, there is plenty of evidence the Roosevelt administration wanted to enter the war long before Dec 1941. Your average American, though, was more concerned with matters at home, and had little interest in Round Two in Europe.
There are those who will say this is a case of our 'leaders' knowing better. I'm not automatically so deferential. Sure, we spared Western Europe from remaining under Nazi domination, but left eastern Europe (including Poland, supposedly the casus belli of the war in 1939) under the heel of Soviet Russia. Was that outcome worth the entry of the U.S. into the European theater? Did we merely trade the possibility of an extended 'cold war' of deterrence with a German Europe for one with the Soviet bloc?
I believe all of our overseas (mis)adventures since the Spanish-American War are a result of forgetting John Adams' view that "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." That is, indeed, a huge mistake. And yet, for all our willingness to go "over there," we seem unable to secure our own borders.
Suppose that instead of Roosevelt the U.S. had a president “more concerned with matters at home” and unwilling to provoke the Axis with embargos and similar “interventionist” gestures. The likely outcome is that, with the U.S. staying neutral, either Germany or the USSR completes the conquest of Europe. Within years of ending the war the victor develops the nuclear weapons (the U.S., being the neutral power, is unlikely to bother with the Manhattan project). Then, the Nazi Germany (or the communist USSR) has a choice of using it to establish itself as an undisputed hegemon of the world or leave the peaceful Americans alone (leaving them also a chance to develop their own nuclear weapons). What would they decide?
Even WITH Roosevelt in office, warned by Einstein in 1939 of the potential of atomic energy, the US didn't get serious about it until six months after Pearl Harbor.
We know from history the Nazi inner circle never gave much support to the German atomic effort; they were more preoccupied with immediate applicability than long term research. And the post-war Soviet atomic achievement was largely through pilfering the Manhattan Project.
Given all that, you *could* argue the advent of atomic weaponry was hastened not by WWII, but by the US entry into it.
Had the Nazis or Soviets established hegemony over Europe (as the USSR did in reality over the eastern half after Yalta), I argue it would have resulted in a Cold War-like standoff with the US and any remaining free powers like the Commonwealth (i.e. pretty much what we got after 1945 anyway).
So, what exactly did our leaders' eagerness to get involved accomplish?
"...the US didn't get serious about it until six months after Pearl Harbor. "
Very true. So how long would it take the US to get serious about it without Pearl Harbor?
"We know from history the Nazi inner circle never gave much support to the German atomic effort; they were more preoccupied with immediate applicability than long term research."
Correct again. In absence of uranium mines there was little chance that Germany could get the weapons made in time. However, after the end of war in Europe there would be little to stop Germany from developing the weapons.
"And the post-war Soviet atomic achievement was largely through pilfering the Manhattan Project."
True, but given time there is no reason they could not do it on their own. After all they did win the first space race which was a much lower priority for them.
"Had the Nazis or Soviets established hegemony over Europe (as the USSR did in reality over the eastern half after Yalta), I argue it would have resulted in a Cold War-like standoff "
The standoff would have been possible only if the US got the bomb first, which would be unlikely were the country to stay neutral. If Germany or the USSR were to get it first they would almost certainly launch a preemptive strike against the US.
The Nazis captured stocks of uranium in Belgium (from the Belgian Congo); this and the fact that Europe's main supply of the ore was in Czechoslovakia is part of what prompted Einstein to write to Roosevelt. The Nazis had the material; they lacked the focus/emphasis to achieve the weapon during the war. Could that have changed after the war? Certainly... but the fact there were already voices of concern in the US leads me to believe the standoff you refer to at the end of your post is about what would have occurred, with the two sides achieving the weapon about the same time, or the U.S. first.
As for the space race, that was a HIGH priority for the Soviets, not a low one. The space race wasn't so much about space (except for the propaganda value) as it was a demonstration of ballistic missile prowess... what would eventually become the primary delivery method for atomic/nuclear weaponry. THAT'S what freaked the US out about Sputnik. It was one thing to consider defending North America against lumbering Bear bombers... quite another to know Ivan could lob nuke missiles.
Consider that much of our last few posts regards the "what might have been." My original post concerned principles upon which to base action. Not knowing the history of 1941-1951, the leaders of the US who looked for an on-ramp into WWII in the late 1930s until Pearl Harbor could not claim atomic bombs or any other data we have the hindsight to know in order to justify their actions. We, in turn, have no way to tell whether their decisions had repercussions that might not have been the case, had things gone a different way.
It's easy to say that because with hindsight we believe WWII turned out as it ought to have, that one can draw the principle our leaders should pursue activist foreign policy. I don't think that's as cut-and-dried a case as some would make it to be.
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